deposits are covered by insurance. Both the FDIC and, until recently, the FSLIC have performed these functions.
The remaining duties performed by the government in regulating depository institutions are supervisory. In general, these oversight duties involve authorizing the establishment of new institutions (chartering), approving the growth of those already operating, and conducting regular examinations to gauge the fmancial health of each institution and that of the industry as a whole.~ Unlike the first two core functions of regulation, no single agency of government is responsible for supervision. Instead, all the federal agencies mentioned so far (and some which will be described later) have shared in the oversight of thrifts and banks.
Despite functioning reasonably well for nearly half a century, this regulatory scheme was far from perfect. To understand the e>..1:ent of these imperfections and how they might be eliminated, this article will evaluate the government's deposit insurance function for regulating banks and thrifts in the context of the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, the most severe test of the deposit insurance system since its creation. After examining this crisis, this article will explore the extent to which merging the supervisory functions of various federal agencies will improve the overall effectiveness of the deposit insurance system.
The Savings and Loan Crisis
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, a series of events brought the deposit insurance system for saving~ and loans to near collapse. In 1979, the Federal Reserve Board discontinued explicitly setting interest rates, its usual method of battling inflation, and concentrated on slowing thegrowth of the money supply, thus letting the credit markets determine interest rates. The result was an interest rate explosion.~ Such high interest rates could not be offered by savings and loans, however, because these institutions were reqUired by the Interest Rate Control Act of 1966 to fund their low-risk mortgage lending with low-yield consumer deposits. s Sky-high interest rates meant that the best returns offered to investors during this period were in money market mutual funds and higher-yielditig securities offered by Wall Street investment finns. Savings and loan depositors SOOn found that the interest earned on their savings accounts was far outstripped by inflation; thus, as long as depositors kept their savings in thrifts, their money lostvalue. To avoid this, depositors began closing accounts in droves, leaving behind a weakened savings and loan industry.
Under both the Carter and Reagan administrations, the federal government attempted to strengthen the thrift GW Policy Perspectives 1994 industry with a hazardous combination of increased deposit insurance coverage and banking deregulation. In other words, the government took on responsibility for more thrift deposits while simultaneously relaxing the rules under which thrifts could invest these deposits. This trend began in 1978 when Congress passed the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act which ~panded FSUC coverage for individual retirement deposits from $40,000 to $100,000 per account. Two years later, the remaining deposits at savings and loans were insured up to $100,000 by the DepOsitory Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980. Congress shortly thereafter passed the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, allOWing thrifts to take much greater risks and seek higher yields when investing depOSitors' money. In addition, the FHLBB relaxed enforcement of accounting standards which allowed institutions to cover up weaknesses in their portfolios. Not to be outdone, many states -especially those suffering disproportionately from the recessionary economy of the early 1980s -exceeded the federal government's standards when deregulating state-chartered thrifts. Thus, the federal government became liable for insuring more deposits while allowing these deposits to be invested with greater risk. These thrifts largely failed because of an amalgam of deliberately high-risk strategies, poor business judgments, foolish strategies, excessive optimism, and sloppy and careless underwriting, compounded by deteriorating real estate markets. s
The result was the insolvency of 364 thrifts by 1988. Although these failures represented only 12 percent of all insured thrifts at the time, they nevertheless brought the FSUC to bankruptcy, effectively leaving every thrift in the nation -billions of dollars in savings and loan deposits -uninsured.9 In 1985, as the number of ruptured savings and loans grew beyond the government's ability to insure deposits, the FSUC -and later Congress -faced a choice between two evils: whether to shut down insolvent thrifts and payoff their depositors immediately or have the FSLIC continue operating these thrifts, thus buying time to recruit new owners. Had the insolvent savings and loans been closed immediately, the FSLIC would have emptied its $6 billion of reserves in a matter of weeks and would still have $9 billion in deposit insurance claims to fulfill just for that year. tO Under this scenario, Congress would be forced to replenish the thrift insurance fund with revenue from taxes, an exceedingly unpopular move during a period of accumulating national debt. Despite these problems, a congressionally-backed emergency plan to meet the crisis head-on might have saved billions of dollars in lost deposits over the long run.lI
The Bank Board Under Edwin J. Gray
The first response by the Bank Board to the rapidly emerging crisis was to eliminate the source of growth for reckless thrifts. To do this, the FHLBB promulgated a regulation barring thrifts from accepting brokered depOSits, those accounts established by stockbrokers for clients seeking the highest possible rate of return while still enjoying deposit insurance protection. By regulating this activity, the Bank Board hoped to slow the explosive growth of irresponsible thrifts and redirect the industry back toward mortgage lending. Although well-intentioned, this first move by Edwin J. Gray This initial failure haunted Gray as he attempted to promote additional refonns. In late 1984, with the worst of the savings and loan disaster beginning to appear on the horizon, ~e Bank Board sought to increase the number of thrift examiners on its staff. To accomplish this, Gray first had to seek the blessing of the director of the Office of Management and Budget, David Stockman -arguably the Reagan administration's most zealous advocate for reducing the federal bureaucracy. Gray's pro-regulation reputation (established after the brokered deposits fiasco) and his request for more bureaucrats conflicted with Stockman's deregulatory ideology.
Gray's political stature with the recently re-elected Reagan administration was so diminished that Stockman would not meet with Gray directly. Instead, Stockman sent his deputy, Constance Homer, to meet the head of the Bank Board. When the OMB eventually rejected the appeal for new examiners, Gray implemented a contin~ gency plan: the examiners would be transferred out of the congressionally-funded FSUC and into the indusllyfunded Federal Home Loan Banks. In so doing, G~y had neatly bypassed the need for OMB approyal.
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Keeping the FSUC Solvent
Despite the initial objections of the Reagan administration to Gray's emergency strategy, there was one plan of action about which the White House and the Bank Board eventually agreed: the thrift insurance fund must be replenished. Given the rate at which savings and loans were going out of bUSiness, the Bank Board argued, more money would have to be given to the insurance fund in order to avert an induslly-wide panic. Although the \Vhite House recognized this problem, the Reagan administration would only endorse a recapitalization plan if the associated costs neither appeared in the federal budget nor were paid for by tax increases. Under these conditions, the \VWte House and the Bank Board compromised on a recapitalization plan in which the FSLIC would be replenished with $15 billion in borrowed Treasury bonds. Although $15 billion would not have resolved the crisis in 1986, the \VWte House-Bank Board compromise was still the only serious option being debated at the time. lS Unfortunately, the election campaigns of several key members in the House and Senate were fmanced by savings and loan executives, so the recapitalization plan was destined to go nowhere. 16 Members like then-House MajOrity Leader Jim Wright (D-Texas) threatened not to vote for the plan until the FHLBB refrained from using its supervisory power in ways which reduced thrift profits,17 Perhaps the most widely known case of Congressional interference of this kind involved five senators "captured" (according to FHLBB meeting notes) in the act of pressuring thrift regulators to back off from their examination of Lincoln Savings and Loan and its owner, Charles Keating -a constituent, a campaign contributor to all five, and, in 1993, a convicted felon.ls The $15 billion Reagan administration recapitalization plan eventually passed both Houses of Congress but died in conference committee. One year later, as the liquid assets of the FSUC dipped below the $1 billion level, a recapitalization plan was reintroduced by the Reagan administration. Although this bill only authorized $11 billion in borrowing audlority (theoretically making the proposal more acceptable to deficit-conscious law makers than the former $15 billion plan), the legislation could be dislodged from an ambivalent Congress only when Reagan threatened to veto any recapitalization bill granting an insufficient level of borrowing. The bill Congress eventually passed, called the Competitive Equality Banking Act (CEBA), was signed by President Reagan in August of 1987. 19 Enactment of CEBA in the summer of 1987 was no small feat. At that time, tlle public ire associated with the thrift crisis had not yet reached a boiling point and many important members of Congress were still under the influence of the savings and loan industry's political action committee money. Ironically, the Reagan administration, a proponent of getting government off tlle backs of business, emerged as the recapitalization bill's most effective advocate.2~ Nevertheless, due to the accelerating pace of thrift insolvencies, the CEBA's relatively puny $11 billion line of credit authorization was obsolete before the legislation was even signed. The estimated assets of either thinly capitalized or completely insolvent savings and GW Policy Perspectives 1994 loans exceeded $400 billion by late 1988. 21 Even if twothirds of these thrifts eventually survived, the FSLIC would undoubtedly need more tllan $11 billion to keep the deposits of the other third from being lost. Sufficient funding for the RTC is one of two good reasons that the savings and loan bail-out will probably come to an end in the early 1990s. The other reason concerns the low interest rates generated by the Federal Reserve in response to the recession of 1990-91. Banks have historically been successful by "borrowing short and lending long" -that is, by paying relatively low interest on depositors' accounts (selling six-month certificates of deposit in the money market, for example) and making long-term loans at relatively higher rates. So long as the long-term interest rates earned by banks exceeded the short-term rates paid GW Policy Perspectives 1994
by banks, the difference (net of expenses) represented a profit. Thus, the low-interest-rate environment of the early 1990s had a salutary effect on the banking and thrift industries by allowing many heretofore weak lenders to improve their balance sheets.
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The Rationale for Additional Reform
Although the industry outlook for depository institutions and their insurance funds now seems healthy after the worst of the savings and loan debacle, there are many lessons still to be learned. Some observers and policymakers have concluded that a complete solution to the savings and loan crisis extends beyond the replenishment of insurance funds and agency restructuring enacted thus far. To take full advantage of the chaotic history of the last decade, the argument goes, govemment must address weaknesses in the deposit insurance system which could only have been revealed during a period of such stress.
Given that so many parts of the system J?roke down simultaneously during the thrift crisis -everything from accounting standards to agency-Congressional relationsonly reforms equal in scope might prevent disaster from recurring. Under such assumptions, the reforms instituted by FIRREA lack the full ability to protect against future meltdowns. Instead of simply repairing parts of the system in the midst of crisis (as FIRREA attempted), the government should redesign the regulatory framework for financial institutions using recent history as its guide.
within this context, several proposals emerged in the winter of 1993-94 to reshape the regulatory structure for banks and thrifts. To better understand these proposals and why such changes might correct many of the structural weak-. nesses revealed during the savings and loan crisis, an expanded description is needed of-thrift and bank regulation.
Defining the Problem
As mentioned earlier, the role of the federal govemment in regulating depository institutions centers on only three core functions: central banking, deposit insurance, and supervision. Given that the Federal Reserve and the FDIC are responsible for central banking and deposit insurance, respectively, logic suggests that some other federal agency should be responsible for supervision. Unfortunately, logic had little to do with the creation of the federal regulatory structure for banks and thrifts. As former FDIC Chairman 1.
William Seidman has pointed out, the Jour federal agencies which share responsibility for bank and thrift supervision do so by virtue of "historical acddent."'z These fout: agen .. cies are the FDIC, the Federal Reserve, the OTS, and the Calculating the exact cost to the taxpayer for such a duplicative supervisory structure is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, the costs of maintaining such a system are unaffordable in this era of tight budgets. For example, one such unnecessary cost is that of operating separate headquarters in Washington, D.C., for all the federal regulators mentioned above. The Federal Reserve, the FDIC, and the OTS also maintain separate field offices across the country. Each of the four regulatory agencies employs thousands of examiners supported by large clerical staffs. Each agency also has separate directors, chairpersons, and other executives who must be nominated by the President and confinned by the Senate.
Indirect costs to taxpayers are incurred in part by the amount of effort each agency must exert simply to understand and comply with changes in the law. To comply with FIRREA, for example, officials at the newly formed RTC found it necessary to map out the entire regulatory landscape for thrifts in an intricate flow chart resembling the circuitry of a computer micro-chip (see Appendix A).3s Instead of providing visual confumation of the sound framework on which government rests, the RTC chart seems to symbolize the opposite.
Banks and thrifts also pay for redundancies in the regulatory structure. Despite attempts at coordinating activities K and sharing infonnation, directives from the different regulators often conflict. In order to avoid violating the government's authority, banks and thrifts must choose between expensive options: attempting to comply with contradictory directives or litigating to have them removed. Ultimately, these costs tend to be passed on to the consumer in the form of higher fees. In addition to eliminating the waste and duplication mentioned earlier, system-wide consolidation similar in scope to the Original Clinton proposal would rectify many of the weaknesses in the regulatory structure which were revealed during the savings and loan disaster. As will be shown, the closer the proposed Federal Banking Commission can be made to resemble the federal government's most effective and independent agendes, the better protected depositors and taxpayers will be from the adversity which afflicted savings and loans in the 1980s.
Reinventing the Regulatory Structure
':tis the history of the late 1980s demonstrates, the deposit insurance system was most vulnerable to mismanagement during presidential election campaigns."
To understand how centralizing federal supervision will help prevent the recurrence of such a debacle, the following premise must first be accepted: the practices of thrifts are now suffidently similar to those of banks. Where the market for credit was once clearly divided between home owners and other kinds of borrowers, most thrifts and banks currently provide similar customers with similar products. Thus, just as the supervision of both radio and television broadcasters is effectively provided by the Federal Communications Commission, the kind of supervision needed for both the thrift and banking industries is now comparable enough to justify a single regulator. 41 Merging thrift and bank regulators would also centralize information concerning the fmancial health and practices of multi-aff.Lliated institutions like Charles Keating's Lincoln Savings and Loan. Instead of hiding high-risk or fraudulent activities in those subsidiaries overseen by the weakest regulators (a practice called "competition in laxity" or "forum shopping"), irresponsible institutions like Lincoln would fmd every part of their operations under the scrutiny of one agency.4l
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Perhaps the single greatest improvement to regulatory supervision stemming from agency consolidation would be the increased political clout that the chairperson of the Banking Commission could wield. Unlike the contempt the White House and Congress showed Edwin Gray when the savings and loan crisis first emerged, the chairperson of the Banking Commission should enjoy the same respect traditionally given to the chairperson of the Federal Reserve Board or to the head of the FDIC.
In addition, future presidents might think twice before nominating (and future legislators might resist confllllling) a controversial figure like Danny Wall to a position of great visibility and responsibility within the government.
Given the importance of preserving the Banking Commission's autonomy, the same Six-year term of office granted to FDIC board members should be granted to the Commission's board members, instead of the fiveyear term proposed in the Clinton plan. In fact, RCA's greatest defect is the proposed four-year term for the chairperson of the Banking Commission. As the history of the late 1980s demonstrates, the deposit insurance system was most vulnerable to mismanagement during presidential election campaigns. Synchronizing the chairperson's term of office with the presidential election cycle may encourage leadership governed by politics instead of the best interests of depositors . .a In addition, the political fault lines which developed during the savings and loan crisis should motivate Congress to remove the proposed position on the Banking Commission's board for the Secretary of the Treasury. As the aforementioned example of former Treasury Secretary Donald Regan suggests, the' pressure on Treasury to ignore and understate the thrift crisis proved overwhelming. fI Given that current and future administrations are likely to continue facing political pressure to ignore important problems, the board of the Banking Commission should be made as free from this pressure as possible, thus encouraging early detection and disclosure of future crises.
The creation of a strong and independent FBC to supervise banks and thrifts will also improve the FDIC's ability to insure deposits. Currently, according to Clinton's Undersecretary of the Treasury, Frank Newman, this is because the FDIC is forced into a potential conflict of interest between insuring deposits and supervising institutions. When the insurance fund is well capitalized, Newman argues, the FDIC has an incentive to use supervisory power in order to "resist banking innovations."-15 In other words, when the banking industry is healthy and the deposit insurance fund is large enough to handle ahnost any problem, the FDIC will discourage the kind of creative activity which markets need in order to stay healthy. Under these conditions, the FDIC behaves like a nervous lifeguard.watching over an Olympic swim team. Although the swimmers are some of the best in the world and although there are plenty of life preservers at the ready, the lifeguard will not allow anyone to swim at a competitive speed.
The government's response to the emerging market for derivatives may by an example of this overly protective behavior. These specialized contracts, which are "derived" from underlying securities, are designed to protect consumers' portfolios from sharp swings in interest rates. Fearful of repeating another savings and loan-type disaster, regulators and law makers have voiced concerns about the increasing level of exposure many of the biggest banks are approaching due to the sale of derivatives. 46 Despite this risk, one could argue that well-capitalized banks with sound reputations are being threatened with a potential rebuke by Congress and regulators for simply developing a profitable f'manciaI product that customers like.
On the other hand, Newman argues that when the insurance fund nears insolvency, the deposit insurance agency "has incentives to forbear."47 In other words, as hundreds of institutions begin to faU and the deposit insurance fund dwindles, the FDIC would become tolerant of risky business practices on the grounds that such practices might improve the industry'S health. In tenns of the aquatic analogy used earlier, imagine a large group of adolescent swimmers whose antics put them at risk of drowning. The lifeguard would then face the dUemma of having too many troubled swimmers and too few life preservers. In order to increase the chance of each swimmer's survival, the lifeguard might resort to dangerous forms of rescue, like allowing speed boats with dangling fishing nets to drag swimmers back to shore.
The Southwest Plan is an example of such risky behavior. With no hope for the recapitalization of the FSUC by Congress, the Bank Board resorted to protecting deposits by selling government-controlled thrifts to anyone who would buy them -no matter how reckless these purchasers may have been in their past business practices. Newman concludes that separating supervisory and insurance functions in accordance with the Clinton plan will "eliminate these conflicts."48
As compelling as Newman's argument for separating the supervisory and insurance functions may be, his analysis has been subject to the same criticism that arose when FIRREA split the government's thrift supervision function 14 away from its deposit insurance function. At that time, critics claimed that bifurcating regulatory functions would also separate the government's two principal tools for maintaining the thrift industry's health: the carrot and the stick. Virtually all banks elect to have deposit insurance (the carrot) because the costs of not having it (lost customer deposits) are far greater than its premiums. Conversely, thrifts and banks do not want depositors to even speculate that their institution is under anything other than routine examination by government agencies (the stick) because customers might conclude that the institution is near insolvency. Therefore, if a single agency possesses the power to use both the carrot of deposit insurance and the stick of examination, such an agency wUl likely have more influence than if these two powers were divided between two separate agencies.
"Despite many strong arguments supporting a more rational structure for regulating depository institutions~ history suggests that no such reform will be enacted until the depository system is in crisis/'
Although the Clinton plan would separate the government's supervisory and insurance functions, there are good reasons to conclude that such a separation would nevertheless increase the government's effectiveness at performing both. To understand this, it is flfSt necessary to understand that any regulatory structure will separate the supervisory and insurance functions to some degree. For example, although the FDIC's Division of Supervision currently exists apart from all the agency's other components, a sufficient level of intra-agency cooperation and information flow exists for the agency to function as a whole. What makes the current regulatory structure problematic (in addition to the duplication and conflicts of interest already discussed) is the absence of this same level of cooperation and infonnation flow between agencies, as opposed to within them.
To fully understand the discord generated by the current system to supervise banks and thrifts, consider the jurisdiction of the FDIC. The nation's deposit insurer currently supervises only those state-chartered banks choosing not to be members of the Federal Reserve System, thereby leaving 40 percent of all domestic banks (holding 76 percent of banking assets) outside the FDIC's supervisory jurisdiction.
4
? \Vhatever effectiveness the government currently has in overseeing the 24 percent of assets held by FDIC-supervised banks would arguably increase if the agency taking over the FDIC's supervisory role could oversee allthe institutions receiving insurance. so
The FBC proposed by the Clinton administration would be such an agency. By providing a single source of information to the FDIC about all the depository institutions receiving insurance, as the Banking Commission would be required to do by law, then the government as a whole might more skillfully keep banks and thrifts healthy while simultaneously insuring deposits. sl The PDIC would also have an easier time coordinating activities with other agencies because there would be fewer federal agencies with which to cooperate. Despite all these assurances, if the FDIC were still dissatisfied with the quality of examinations or the flow of information provided by the Pede,ral Banking Commission, the FDIC's current examination and enforcement power would be retained as "back-up authority" under the Clinton plan. 52 
Notes
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Conclusion Despite many strong arguments supporting a more rational structure for regulating depository institutions, history suggests that no such' reform will be enacted until the depository system is in crisis. As has been described, the deposit insurance system was created to calm panicked depositors during a period of unprecedented economic stress. All of the major refonns since then were spurred by the threat of disaster as well. The thrift deregulation of the early 19805 was enacted in order to save the industry from the damaging effects of inflation. The re-regulation and agency consolidation of the late 1980s was instituted in order to protect the industry from its own improprieties. Neither the inflation nor the same level of reckless abuse of the 1980s exists now. Nevertheless, if we as a nation can learn from the past and leave behind our tendency to react to crises, the relatively secure environment of the present may well be the best time to reshape the regulatory structure for banks and thrifts. * 11 Some observers have suggested that the recapitalization of the FSUC would only have cost $20 billion if Congress demonstrated the courage to intervene at the ftrst signs of crisis. As early as 1985, the Bank Board itself estimated the cost of resolving failed savings and loans would only have been between $45 and $50 billion, according to R. Dan Brumbaugh, Jr., a former Bank Board economist See Robert Sherrill, "The Looting Decade," The Nation, November 19, 1990, p. 608, and R. Dan Brumbaugh, Jr., in written testimony before the Senate Banking Committee, March 4, 1994, p. 12. 12 Pizzo, Fricker, and Muoio, pp. 106 and 352. 13 Seven months later an appellate court upheld the district court's ruling in FAlC Securities Inc. v. U.S. 595 F. Supp. 73 (1984 ), 753 F. 2nd 166 (1985 ), 762 F. 2nd. 352 (1985 . See White, p. 127. 
